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waiver of juvenile court jurisdiction in capital cases involving 15 year penalty. In Virginia, age is a statutorily enumerated mitigating
olds was unacceptable under Trop. Thompson still means that factor. The plurality held that finding lack of moral blameworthiness
Virginia cannot execute 15 year olds unless the General Assembly is the jury's responsibility. Thus the defense must persuade the jury
votes to allow it. However, Justice O'Connor in the cases at bar was during individual examination that the defendant is not sufficiently
not persuaded that a national consensus exists against executing 16 or blameworthy to impose the death penalty. The dissenters mentioned
17 year olds. Therefore the state legislatures are not required societal shared blame for the crimes of young offenders with
specifically to authorize their execution, disastrous childhoods. The plurality did not discount the value of
Also Stanford establishes the supreme importance of present- such mitigating evidence. It held that all mitigation evidence is for
ing a persuasive, individualized case in mitigation. The entire Court the jury to examine and evaluate.
held that some 16 and 17 year old offenders may be so undeveloped
that they are not sufficiently blameworthy to warrant the death Summary and alaysis by: Kerry D. Lee
SOUTH CAROLINA v. GATHERS
109 S. Ct. 2207,104 L. Ed. 2d 876 (1989)
United States Supreme Court
In a five to four decision the Supreme Court (Justice Brennan,
joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens and White [concur-
ring]), held that a prosecutor's comments pertaining to personal
characteristics of the victim made during the sentencing phase of a
capital trial were irrelevant to the sentencing decision, and necessi-
tated a new sentencing hearing. Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting
opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy
joined. Justice Scalia filed a separate dissent.
FACTS
Demetrius Gathers and several accomplices had been walking
through a park when they encountered the victim, Richard Haynes.
After Haynes failed to respond to Gathers' attempt to start a conver-
sation, Gathers and his friends beat the victim severely. While the
victim was apparently unconscious, Gathers forced an umbrella into
the victim's anus causing a perforated rectum. A short time later
Gathers returned to the scene, stabbed the victim, and proceeded to
search through his belongings in an attempt to find something of
value to steal.
Gathers was convicted in the General Sessions Court of
Charleston County on the charges of murder and first-degree criminal
sexual conduct. He was sentenced to death during the sentencing
phase of South Carolina's bifurcated capital trial system. He appealed
to the Supreme Court of South Carolina which affirmed his convic-
tion, but reversed the death sentence. In its decision the court cited
Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529,96 L. Ed. 2d 440
(1987), and held that comments made by the prosecution during its
closing arguments deprived Gathers of his Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights by allowing the jury to consider evidence that was
irrelevant to the sentencing decision. State v. Gathers, 295 S.C. 476,
369 S.E.2d 140 (1988). South Carolina petitioned the Supreme Court
for certiorari, and in an opinion filed by Justice Brennan the Supreme
Court affirmed the reversal of the death sentence.
HOLDING
In the plurality opinion, the Court affirmed the reversal of
Gathers' death sentence and restated its holding in Enmundv.
Florida, that "'for purposes of imposing the death penalty,., the
defendant's punishment must be tailored to his personal responsibil-
ity and moral guilt.' Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2210, quoting Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, (1982)), 102 S. Ct. 3368, 73 L. Ed. 2d 1140.
ANALYSIS
In Gathers, the prosecution's closing arguments encouraged the
jury to draw inferences about the victim's personal life from items he
had in his possession at the time of his death. In particular, the
prosecutor drew elaborate analogies to the victim's character from a
laminated prayer and a voter registration card. Both of these items,
the Court pointed out, were unlikely to have been seen or read by the
accused. In holding that this evidence was irrelevant to the sentencing
decision, the Court stated that "the content of the various papers ...
was purely fortuitous, and cannot provide any information relevant to
the defendant's moral culpability... [and] their content cannot be
said to relate directly to the circumstances of the crime." Id. at 2211.
Although the Court stated that the content of the items was irrelevant,
it indicated that the act of searching through the victim's belongings
and callously scattering them about, was a proper factor to be
considered by the jury. However, because the evidence showed that
Gathers had no knowledge of the victim's possessions or background
when he made his decision to kill, prosecutorial comment beyond the
act itself was improper.
In reaching its decision, the Court relied heavily on its previous
holding in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987). In Booth, the
Court held that the use of a victim impact statement during the
sentencing phase of a capital trial was improper because it focused on
the victim, and on "factors about which the defendant was unaware,
and that were irrelevant to the decision to kill." Id. at 505. Specifi-
cally, the victim impact statements in Booth were a compilation of
the emotional, physical and economic harm which the family suffered
as a result of the killing of their parents.
The holding and analysis in Booth was also relevant to Gathers'
claim that his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been
violated by allowing the jury to administer arbitrary and capricious
punishments. The Court in Booth held that the admission of irrelevant
evidence, similar to the evidence admitted in Gathers, "creates a
constitutionally unacceptable risk that the jury may impose the death
penalty in an arbitrary and capricious manner." Id. at 503. The Court
reasoned that the admission of such evidence could foster arbitrary
findings by: 1) "divert[ing] the jury's attention away from the
defendant's background ... and the circumstances of the crime"; and
2) by the random variations of each family's communicative abilities
"in expressing their grief." Id. at 505. "iThere [is no] justification for
permitting such a decision [life or death] to turn on the perception
that the victim was a sterling member of the community rather than
someone of questionable character." Id. at 506.
The holdings in Booth and Gathers are somewhat analogous to
the holding in California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 107 S. Ct. 837, 93
L. Ed. 2d 934 (1987). In Brown, the Court held that it was pennis-
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sible to have a jury instruction indicating that the jurors were not to
be swayed by sympathy or passion as long as they were still able to
consider legitimate mitigating factors. Conversely, in a situation
similar to the one in Gathers a jury should not be swayed or influ-
enced by emotion or sympathy for the victim or victim's family, but
instead should focus on the acts and intentions of the defendant.
Upon review the Court concluded that evidence regarding
factors about which the accused was unaware and that did not
influence his decision to kill were inadmissible during the sentencing
phase of a capital trial. Therefore, the Court held that the death
sentence must be reversed and the defendant granted a new sentenc-
ing hearing. Gathers at 2211. It should be noted that Justice White,
who filed the dissenting opinion in Booth, filed a separate concurring
opinion in Gathers. Justice White's concurrence was apparently
based solely on his refusal to overrule the Court's prior holding in
Booth. Id.
Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy joined. In the dissent Justice
O'Connor argued that the holding of the majority was a broad
reading of Booth that effectively barred the admission of any
evidence pertaining to the victim. Gathers at 2212. This assertion is
made in spite of the majority's statement that, "Our opinion in Booth
... left open the possibility that the kind of information contained in
victim impact statements could be admissible if it'related directly to
the circumstances of the crime."' Id. at 2211. Thus, while limiting the
type of evidence pertaining to the victim and circumstances under
which it is admissible, the majority opinion has not totally barred the
admission of such evidence.
It should be noted that even prior to the holding in Gathers,
Virginia law barred prosecutorial commentary on the "harm" the
accused's acts caused the victim's family. Dingus v. Commonwealth,
153 Va. 846, 149 S.E. 414 (1929). In Dingus, the prosecutor stated
that if it were not for the act of the defendant, the victim's wife would
not be a widow. Id. at 850. In reversing the verdict of guilty and
remanding for a new trial, the Court in Dingus stated, "Whatever
liberties are permitted to counsel... to appeal for mercy for their
clients ... the prosecutor has no corresponding liberty... the
Commonwealth does not rely either upon prejudice or sympathy for
the enforcement of its laws." Id. This bar on prosecutorial commen-
tary is effective, despite the fact that such evidence may be admis-
sible during the guilt phase to prove, for example, that the victim was
not the aggressor.
As stated previously, the Gathers error occured during the
prosecution's closing arguments offered in the sentencing phase of
Gathers' trial. Attorneys representing capital defendants in Virginia
should consider that the longstanding custom of not objecting to an
opponent's closing argument is not, as Gathers demonstrates,
applicable in a capital proceeding. The arguments of the Common-
wealth Attorney may also be objectionable on additional grounds.
(See, discussion of Caldwell v. Mississippi in the summary of Dugger
v. Adams-[this issue]). Further, capital defense attorneys should
recognize that failure to contemporaneously object to the arguments
of the Commonwealth Attorney could effectively bar appellate
review of potential Constitutional errors.
Summary and analysis by: Thomas Marlowe
DUGGER v. ADAMS
109 S. Ct. 1211, 103 L. Ed. 2d 435 (1989)
United States Supreme Court
FACTS
In 1978 Adams was brought to trial for first-degree murder and
the state of Florida sought to impose the death penalty. At voir dire,
the trial judge informed the veniremen that their recommendations
were not binding on the court: "The Court is not bound by your
recommendation. ... You are merely an advisory group to me in
Phase Two. ... So that this conscience part of it as to whether or not
you're going to put the man to death or not, that is not your decision
to make.... 109 S. Ct. at 1213. "In addition, the judge interrupted
counsel's voir dire on two occasions to repeat that the court, not the
jury, was responsible for sentencing, and again instructed the jury to
that effect before it began its deliberations. Defense counsel did not
object at any point to these instructions." Id. Veniremembers
ultimately selected for the trial heard the judge's explanation of the
law at least once and several heard it more than once. Id. On direct
appeal and in his initial state and federal motions for habeas relief
Adams did not cite these instructions as error on either state or
federal grounds.
While Adams was still pursuing his first round of federal habeas
appeals, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472
U.S. 320, 105 S. Ct. 2633, 86 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1985), holding that "it
is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a
determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe that
the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defen-
dant's death rests elsewhere". When his initial habeas motion failed,
Adams filed a second motion for postconviction relief in which he
challenged, for the first time, the statements of the trial judge on
Caldwell grounds. Adams, in this second motion, argued that "the
judge's instructions violated the Eighth Amendment by misinforming
the jury of its role under Florida law. According to respondent,
although the Florida death penalty statute provided that the jury's
recommendation was only advisory, the Florida Supreme Court had
held that a trial judge could only override the jury's verdict if the
facts were "so clear and convincing that virtually no reasonable
person could differ.'... Since the trial judge ... told the jurors that the
sentencing responsibility was solely his and failed to tell them that he
could override their verdict only under limited circumstances,
respondent argued, the judge misled the jury in violation of
Caldwell." Adams, 109 S. Ct. at 1214, citing Tedder v. State, 322 So.
2d 908, 910 (Fla. 1975). The Florida Supreme Court, on grounds that
Adams did not raise the argument on direct appeal, refused to address
the merits of the Caldwell argument, and in a second federal habeas
petition the District Court held the Caldwell claim to be procedurally
barred, and in the alternative, that it was without merit. The Eleventh
Circuit reversed, holding that "respondent's Caldwell claim 'was so
novel at the time of ... trial in ... 1978 and his sentencing and appeal
in early 1979 that its legal basis was not reasonably available at that
time'."Adams v. Wainwright, 816 F.2d 1493,1498 (llth Cir. 1987).
HOLDING
The United States Supreme Court did not decide whether the
trial judge's action violated Caldwell due to its determination that
there was no acceptable excuse for Adams' failure to object to the
judge's action at trial and thereby give the Florida court a chance to
rule on the matter. As the 11 th Circuit decided, there is a recognized
excuse for failing to raise claims at trial and so preserve them on
